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Abstract: This paper critically examines the law of forum non con-
veniens, in particular the use of the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test in
Australia, compared with the ‘more appropriate forum’ test applied in
jurisdictions such as the UK and the US. It traces the development of the
law in the UK in relation to forum non conveniens, including the English
acceptance of the doctrine, and how it has been applied in various cases.
Some criticism of the ‘more appropriate forum’ test is noted, and it is
not recommended that the courts adopt the ‘laundry list’ approach evid-
ent in some US decisions, where up to 25 different factors are con-
sidered in assessing a forum non conveniens application. It considers
the Australian ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test, and concludes that the
‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test should no longer be followed in that it
is unnecessarily parochial and is not consistent with other goals of the
rules of private international law including comity. Links between
Australia and the subject matter may well be tenuous. Confusion attends
the application of the test in Australia at present, the court has rejected
the English approach but claims to apply some of the factors mentioned
in the English approach in the Australian test, and there is an undesir-
able schism between statutory rules applicable in domestic cases and
the approach when the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens
is used. The law regarding forum non conveniens should be harmonious
with choice of law rules, and interest analysis can assist in formulating
the desired approach to forum non conveniens applications.
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I. Introduction
In a recent High Court of Australia decision,1 two members2 of the
High Court indicated that they were at least willing to listen to a full
argument that the present formulation of the forum non conveniens
test should be reconsidered. In this paper, I will explore in more detail
the current forum non conveniens doctrine as applied in Australian
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1 Puttick v Tenon Ltd (2008) 83 ALJR 93.
2 Heydon and Crennan JJ.
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and overseas courts, before considering whether the law in Australia
in this respect should be liberalized, as has occurred in other coun-
tries. It will be necessary to consider in some detail the test used, and
how it has been applied, in other chosen jurisdictions. We can learn
from the overseas experience, with a much greater volume of case law
to test particular rules, in reviewing the Australian rule. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to consider the grounds upon which jurisdic-
tion is exercised by courts; my concern here is with the right to refuse
to exercise jurisdiction that is otherwise properly asserted. However,
links between decline of jurisdiction and choice of law are noted, and
interest analysis discussed, and these aspects support the author’s
preferred test for the application of the doctrine.
II. Brief History of Jurisdiction in Great Britain
In order to fully appreciate the Australian position, it is necessary to
trace some of the developments relating to jurisdiction as they relate
to forum non conveniens. There was originally no need for the doc-
trine; trials were held in the jurisdiction in which the relevant events
arose, due to the need for members of the jury, who then acted as
witnesses, to have local actual knowledge of events.3 As the role of the
jury changed, so the need that a matter be heard only by courts in the
jurisdiction in which the events occurred waned, and courts became
more comfortable about hearing matters with more tenuous links
with a jurisdiction.
At this time, however, the existence of jurisdiction required the
presence of both parties. Defendants had a natural incentive to leave
or remain outside of a jurisdiction in which a claim might be brought
against them. This led to the introduction of the so-called mesne pro-
cess, involving seizure of the defendant’s property or even arrest in
order to secure their presence in court.4 Commentators at the time
noted the trend of English residents fleeing the jurisdiction in order to
avoid suit, and called for legislative action.5 Legislative action resulted,
with a list of three instances whereby a court could hear a matter
involving a defendant absent from the jurisdiction who had been
properly notified of the proceedings. This list grew to five and then to
seven. A common call was the need for broad grounds in order to
facilitate British commerce, not surprising in the Industrial Revolution
3 Henry Stephen, A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions:
Comprising a Summary of the Whole Proceedings in a Suit at Law (Stevens:
London, 1895) 315–28; William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. 5
(Methuen: London, 1923) 117–19, 140–2; James Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence at the Common Law (Little, Brown: Boston, 1898) ch. 2.
4 See Michael Karayanni, ‘The Myth and Reality of a Controversy: “Public Factors”
and the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine’ (2003) 21 Wisconsin International Law
Journal 327.
5 ‘Service of Common Law Process Abroad’ (1844) 27 Legal Observer 387 at 389.
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era.6 The common feature was a meaningful connection between Eng-
land and the controversy.
The requirement for a connection between the jurisdiction selected
and the dispute has been replicated to various degrees in the US,7
Canada8 and Australia.9
On the other hand, writers such as Huber, Story and Dicey emphas-
ized the territorial aspect of jurisdiction. Parliaments and courts did
not have unlimited jurisdiction; if they were to assert such jurisdic-
tion, it would be offensive to the sovereign authority of other nations.
An example of this thinking occurs in Ex Parte Blain, where the court
denied jurisdiction in respect of a foreigner’s bankruptcy petition
brought in England:
The whole question is governed by the broad, general universal prin-
ciple that English legislation, unless the contrary is expressly enacted or
so plainly implied as to make the duty of an English court to give effect
to an English statute, is applicable only to English subjects or to for-
eigners who by coming into this country, whether for a long or a short
time, have made themselves during that time subjects of English juris-
diction. . . . It is not consistent with ordinary principles of justice or the
comity of nations that the legislature of one country should call on the
subject of another country to appear before its tribunals when he has
never been within their jurisdiction.10
As a result, the law needed to reach some accommodation between
the need, on the one hand, to deal with difficulties associated with
defendants absent from the jurisdiction and, on the other hand, not to
claim unlimited jurisdiction and in so doing offend the sovereignty
and interests of other nations. This accommodation came to be the
6 William Charley, The New System of Practice and Pleading Under the Supreme
Court of Judicature Acts 1873, 1875, 1877, The Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 and
the Rules of the Supreme Court, 3rd edn (Waterlow: London, 1877) 415–36. The
application of the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens in England is
now excluded in cases where the court’s jurisdiction is determined by European
Council Regulation No. 44 (2001).
7 International Shoe Co v Washington 326 US 310 (1945).
8 Morguard v De Savoye (1990) 76 DLR (4th) 256, SCC; Beals v Saldanha [2003] 3
SCR 416; Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (Uniform Law
Conference of Canada).
9 Factors include that the defendant is ordinarily resident or domiciled in the
jurisdiction, the litigation concerns activities that have occurred or will occur
within the state, it concerns property within the state, the defendant has
submitted to the jurisdiction, where local legislation applies to the dispute, or the
defendant’s participation will facilitate local litigation: see Mary Keyes,
Jurisdiction in International Litigation (Federation Press: Sydney, 2005) 53–6.
10 (1879) 12 LR ChD 522, CA; ‘all jurisdiction is properly territorial’: Sirdar Gurddyal
Singh v Rajah of Faridkote [1894] App Cas 670 at 683, PC; ‘the general rule of law
based upon the comity of nations is that an English writ has no efficacy and
cannot be served in a foreign country’: Wilding v Bean [1891] 1 QB 100 at 101–2,
CA. The principle was recently recognized by members of the High Court: ‘The
considerations of comity and restraint, to which reference has so often been made
in cases concerning service out of the jurisdiction, will often be of greatest
relevance in considering questions of forum non conveniens’: Agar v Hyde (2000)
201 CLR 552 at 571.
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leave provisions providing for service of process outside of the juris-
diction with the court’s permission, coupled with a right to stay pro-
ceedings based on the defendant’s presence within the jurisdiction if
the interests of justice required it, or forum non conveniens.
We can of course argue about the extent to which the balance
between these principles is correct, or whether the growth of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens discussed below has occurred be-
cause the rules of jurisdiction are not appropriately strict.11 On the
other hand, it can be argued that there is a need for some general
rules of jurisdiction to provide certainty, balanced by principles that
consider the specific circumstances of the case. The reality might be
that it is not possible to come up with rules of jurisdiction that will
serve the interests of justice in every case, and that there is a need, at
least to some extent, for a doctrine such as forum non conveniens to
deal with specific cases where, although according to the rules juris-
diction exists, it should not, because of the lack of strong connection
with the jurisdiction, be exercised.
This difficulty has led some to suggest a merger of the principles to
one enquiry rather than a two-stage process.12 I concede the merit of
such a suggestion but do not explore it in detail here. Others have
11 As Karayanni says, the rules of jurisdiction might reflect an emphasis on
territoriality that is much less acceptable in the discipline today: ‘Deeper reflection
on the function of the forum non conveniens doctrine, whether as a vehicle for the
proper allocation of public resources or as a cordon against forum shopping,
suggests that there is something flawed with jurisdictional rules. Why have these
rules afforded jurisdictional competency in the first place when the case is one
where judicial resources will be spent on an unconnected dispute and in a case in
which the plaintiff is engaging in outright forum shopping? . . . The answer to this
peculiar phenomenon seems to lie in the flawed nature of the rules of most
common law countries for determining jurisdictional competence, at least as far
as personal jurisdiction is concerned. These rules are still dependent on a
territorial nexus of one sort or another (e.g. presence, conclusion of a contract,
commission of a tort) . . . As jurisdictional theory has moved from identifying in
the territorial connection something central to the jurisdictional enquiry to
stressing the fairness of jurisdictional competence, these territorial nexuses
seemed to be outmoded. But since most common law jurisdictions have chosen to
keep these territorial connections as guiding indications for acquiring
jurisdiction, it seemed necessary to supplement the enquiry with an additional
one to determine if jurisdiction is of a proper nature. In essence, the nexus of
competency was built on a territorial basis, but the jurisdictional enquiry wanted
to build on a fairness assessment’: above n. 4 at 342–3.
12 Margaret Stewart, ‘Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role’ (1986)
74 California Law Review 1259; David Robertson, ‘The Federal Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens: An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion’ (1994) 29 Texas
International Law Journal 353 at 378; ‘Forum Non Conveniens: A Rather Fantastic
Fiction’ (1987) 103 Law Quarterly Review 398; A. Ehrenzweig, ‘The Transient Rule
of Personal Jurisdiction: The Power “Myth” and Forum Conveniens’ (1956) 65 Yale
Law Journal 289; Alex Albright, ‘In Personam Jurisdiction: A Confused and
Inappropriate Substitute for Forum Non Conveniens’ (1992) 71 Texas Law Review
351 at 353, and Judge Learned Hand (Latimer v S/A Industries 175 F. 2d 184 (2nd
Cir, 1949). Karayanni claims the rules for determining jurisdiction in most
common law countries are an anachronism, inappropriately reflecting the law’s
past reverence for territorialism, at the expense of a more sophisticated approach:
Karayanni, above n. 4 at 342–3.
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suggested that the principles of jurisdiction should be re-drawn, with
possible models being the recent European model13 or some other
approach.14 For the purposes of this paper, I will take the existing
grounds of jurisdiction as a given, and not argue that they are too
broad or too narrow, and my discussion of the forum non conveniens
doctrine will take place in that context.
III. Development of the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine in
Great Britain
This stay order came to be recognized by Lord Kinnear in Sim v
Robinow in the following terms:
The plea can never be sustained unless the court is satisfied that there is
some other tribunal, having competent jurisdiction, in which the case
may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the
ends of justice.15
Perhaps the starting point in terms of modern development is the
1936 decision in St Pierre v South American Stores (Gath and Chaves)
Ltd,16 where Scott LJ held that a mere balance of convenience did not
justify a stay of proceedings. A stay required evidence that (a) the
continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be
vexatious or oppressive to the defendant or an abuse of process; and
(b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.17 At this time
the court maintained that it was not applying the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, which had Scottish origins, but was considering the
general power of courts to stay proceedings that were properly
brought within it. However, dissatisfaction began to appear with the
approach in St Pierre, with Lordships in The Atlantic Star stating that
the requirements of ‘vexatiousness’ or ‘oppression’ should be applied
(more) liberally18 in order to promote greater comity between nations
and avoid parochialism.19 The previous test was criticized on the basis
that it promoted forum shopping.20
13 Council Regulation No. 864/2001.
14 Keyes, above n. 9 at 254–67.
15 (1892) 19 R 665 at 668.
16 [1936] 1 KB 382 at 398.
17 The defendant would need to prove both matters.
18 Atlantic Star v Bona Spec [1974] AC 436, Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce and Lord
Kilbrandon.
19 For example, Lord Reid referred to comments of Lord Denning MR in [1973] QB
364 at 381 that ‘no one who comes to these courts asking for justice should come
in vain . . . This right to come here is not confined to Englishmen. It extends to
any friendly foreigner . . . You may call this “forum shopping” if you please, but if
the forum is England, it is a good place to shop in, both for the quality of the
goods and the speed of service.’ Lord Reid then added that ‘that seems to recall
the good old days, the passing of which many regret, when inhabitants of this
island felt an innate superiority over those unfortunate enough to belong to other
races . . . I think that the time is ripe for a re-examination of the rather insular
doctrine to which I have referred.’
20 Atlantic Star, above n. 18 at 454, Lord Reid.
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The test was re-formulated in 1978 to one asking whether there was
another forum where justice could be done at substantially less incon-
venience or expense, and whether the stay would deprive the plaintiff
of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage if an English court
heard the matter.21 The oppressive or vexatious test fell out of favour.
By 1984, English courts came to accept that the positions of English
law and Scottish law on this issue were the same; in other words, the
doctrine of forum non conveniens was accepted into English law.22
Further refinements occurred in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v
Cansulex Ltd,23 where the current common law approach was laid out.
Lord Goff, with whom all other Lords concurred, laid out fundamental
principles, including that a stay would only be granted on the basis of
forum non conveniens if the court is satisfied that there is some other
available forum having competent jurisdiction which is the appro-
priate forum. If the court is so satisfied, the plaintiff would then have
to demonstrate why the interests of the parties and/or the ends of
justice required the trial to be held in the original forum.24 Several
factors were relevant in assessing the stay application, including
which place had the most ‘real and substantial connection’ to the
action, the availability of witnesses, the governing law, the places
where the parties live or carry on business, or the fact that the plaintiff
will not obtain justice in the foreign jurisdiction.25 The mere fact that
the award of damages might be lower in the foreign jurisdiction is not
21 MacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd [1978] AC 795.
22 The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398 at 411.
23 [1987] AC 460.
24 For example, a limitation period had expired in the other possible forum, and
there were good reasons based on past practice why the plaintiff did not think
they needed to worry about that limitation period: Tehrani v Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2007] 1 AC 521, HL; or that the plaintiff would be entitled
to legal aid funding if the (chosen) British forum heard the matter, but would not
be so entitled if the foreign forum heard the matter: Connolly v R.T.Z. Corporation
Plc and Another [1998] AC 854, HL; or that the foreign forum lacked the
infrastructure needed in order that the rule of law could be upheld: Alberta Inc v
Katanga Mining Ltd and Others [2009] 1 BCLC 189, QB.
25 Above n. 23 at 476–8. These developments have been criticized on the basis that
they replace an easy to apply test with a difficult balancing exercise: see A.G.
Slater, ‘Forum Non Conveniens: A View From the Shop Floor’ (1988) 104 Law
Quarterly Review 554 at 569. It should be noted that these issues can arise in two
separate situations: either where the jurisdiction of the English courts is invoked
as of right, for example the defendant was present or remains present in the
jurisdiction and was properly served; in such cases the defendant may raise forum
non conveniens as a defence; on the other hand, where the plaintiff seeks the
leave necessary to effect service pursuant to Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court, the plaintiff will need to establish that England is a forum conveniens.
Similar principles are applied in the cases, though in the former case, the (initial)
burden of proof is on the defendant, while in the latter case, the burden is on the
plaintiff. In this respect, the court in Spiliada overruled past practice whereby a
stricter approach was taken to forum non conveniens actions than forum
conveniens actions: St Pierre, above n. 16 at 398.
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sufficient of itself to show that the chosen forum is more
appropriate.26
The decisions show that the nature of the factor giving the forum
court jurisdiction is also relevant; for example, where assertion of
jurisdiction depends on the fact that the tort was committed in the
jurisdiction, the court has found that the forum court is prima facie the
natural forum for the dispute to be heard,27 whereas if the assertion of
jurisdiction depends merely on the fact that the proper law is the law
of the forum, it seems that the court is more willing to grant a stay on
the basis that the assertion of jurisdiction is ‘exorbitant’.28
These principles were re-affirmed in the most recent House of
Lords decision of Lubbe and Cape Plc.29 The case involved a number
of plaintiffs suing the defendant, an English incorporated company, in
respect of mining operations of its subsidiary companies in South
Africa. It was alleged that the plaintiffs suffered asbestos-related ill-
nesses as a result of these operations. The House of Lords noted that
much of the documentation surrounding the extent to which the de-
fendant had control and management, or knowledge of, the South
African operations of its subsidiaries would be found in its offices in
England; on the other hand, the 3,000-plus plaintiffs were in South
Africa, and aspects of their condition could more conveniently be
investigated in that country. Evidence differed as to the extent to
which a South African law firm might be prepared to take on, and
might have the resources to run, such a large case against the defend-
ant, but the court concluded that, on the balance of the evidence, it
was likely that no South African firm would take on such a large case,
particularly on a contingency fee basis which was the only realistic
basis on which the claim could be run. As a result, the court refused to
stay the continuation of the English proceedings, rejecting the
defendant’s plea.
In so deciding, the House of Lords specifically rejected arguments
about public interest or public policy. It decided that issues such as the
expense and inconvenience to the administration of justice and other
‘public policy’ arguments were not relevant; relevant issues were con-
fined to the interests of the parties in the particular case and the ends
of justice in that particular matter. Courts were not equipped to make
26 Spiliada, above n. 23 at 482, Lord Goff; Agbaje v Agbaje [2009] All ER (D) 130,
para. 51: ‘The problem is . . . that whether the result is unjust may depend upon
which end of the telescope one is using to find the answer. Injustice seen here for
one side may be reflected by injustice as seen there for the other side’ (Ward LJ,
with whom Jackson LJ agreed).
27 Berezovsky v Michaels and Others; Glouchkov v Michaels and Others [2002] 2 All
ER 986, HL.
28 Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50 at 65–6, HL;
Novus Aviation Ltd v Onus Air Tasimacilik AS [2009] All ER (D) 275 (para. 53).
29 [2000] UKHL 41.
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any broader enquiries.30 In effect, this was a rejection of the American
approach to such applications, as will be seen.
IV. Australian Position
There is evidence of initial adherence to the ‘vexatious’ or ‘oppressive’
tests,31 but the High Court considered the matter in depth in the
Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay,32 a decision made
after the Spiliada case. Unfortunately, three different approaches were
taken in the case, making it unsatisfactory from a precedent point of
view. It is necessary to consider these views in more detail.
i. Brennan J
Brennan J disagreed with the liberalization of the test which culmin-
ated in the Spiliada decision. He did not favour a test based on a
balancing exercise or what the interests of justice required, because
he said it would inevitably lead to considering the substantive law that
would be applied in each court if the matter were heard there.33 It was
impossible, he said, for our courts to compare justice according to
different laws in order to say which satisfied the ends of justice. He
said the new English approach would be
[i]nconsistent with what we have hitherto understood to be the function
and the duty of courts; the function of enforcing rights and liabilities
according to the law of the forum . . . and the duty to exercise jurisdic-
tion which is regularly invoked unless the invocation of the jurisdiction
is oppressive, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process . . ..34 If we are
confident of the quality of justice administered in Australian courts,
there is no reason why we should defer to other fora.35
Brennan J was in favour of applying the vexatious, oppressive and/or
abuse of process test.
ii. Deane and Gaudron JJ
Deane J prefaced his views on forum non conveniens with a re-
assertion of the view that a party who has regularly invoked the
jurisdiction of a competent court had a prima facie right to insist upon
its exercise. The ability to stay proceedings should thus be exercised
30 This is similar to the position reached by Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron
JJ in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 561.
31 Maritime Insurance Co Ltd v Geelong Harbour Trust Commissioners (1908) 6 CLR
194; Rutt v Metropolitan Underwriters (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1929] SASR 426;
Telford Panel and Engineering Works Pty Ltd v Elder Smith Goldsborough Mort
Ltd [1969] VR 193.
32 (1988) 165 CLR 197.
33 This was at a time when, at least in matters of tort (which Oceanic involved), the
law of the forum was applied as part of double actionability: see Koop v Bebb
(1951) 84 CLR 629; Anderson v Eric Anderson Radio and TV Pty Ltd (1965) 114
CLR 20.
34 Above n. 32 at 238.
35 Ibid. at 240.
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with extreme caution, where to continue with the matter in the chosen
forum was so inappropriate that it would produce injustice, oppres-
sion or vexation of the defendant.36 It was not a more general enquiry
as to whether there was a more appropriate forum, or what the over-
all administration of justice might require. Deane J expressed agree-
ment with the liberal views expressed in The Atlantic Star that
oppression or vexation need not involve moral delinquency on the
plaintiff’s part.37
He concluded that a ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test should be
applied, to be met by the defendant, rather than a ‘more appropriate
forum’ test. Usually the defendant would have to show the availability
of another forum to whose jurisdiction they were amenable and
which would entertain the claim. The continuation of proceedings in a
clearly inappropriate forum would be oppressive or vexatious to the
defendant.38 Deane J stated that the factors referred to in Spiliada
would be relevant in applying the doctrine he favoured.39 Deane J
argued that his view was able to be reconciled with the ‘frivolous and
vexatious’ test while the Spiliada approach was not,40 and that the
High Court decision in Maritime Insurance Co (which had accepted
the vexatious approach) was of long standing.41 He believed that there
were policy arguments both in favour of the Spiliada approach in
terms of convenience of the parties and international comity, but also
against in terms of increased uncertainty over where to litigate.42
In terms of the facts, Deane J weighed up factors relevant both to
Greece and New South Wales, concluding that Greece was the ‘most
appropriate forum’ in relation to a particular issue.43
Gaudron J adopted a similar approach to Deane J.44 In considering
the changes made to English law culminating in Spiliada, Gaudron J
claimed that those developments might be explicable in terms of
underlying changes to English governance, including membership of
the (now) European Union, so that Australia should be careful in
automatically adopting the changes made to the law in England.45
36 Ibid. at 244.
37 Ibid. at 247.
38 Ibid. at 248. Deane J made it clear that he did not accept the Spiliada ‘more
appropriate forum’ test—‘the mere fact that a tribunal in some other country
would be a more appropriate forum for the particular proceeding does not
necessarily mean that the local court is a clearly inappropriate one’ (ibid. at 248).
39 Ibid. at 251.
40 Ibid. at 252.
41 Ibid. at 253.
42 Ibid. at 253–4.
43 Ibid. at 256.
44 She expressly adopted the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test (ibid. at 266).
45 Above n. 32 at 263.
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iii. Wilson and Toohey JJ
These judges would have applied the Spiliada approach in Australia.
In their view, English developments could not be explained in terms of
that country’s entry into the European Union:
Rather, this century has witnessed such a transformation in communica-
tions and travel, coupled with a greater importance attaching to con-
siderations of international comity as the nations of the world become
more closely related to each other, as to render the St Pierre principle,
fashioned as it was in the nineteenth century, inappropriate to modern
conditions . . . The St Pierre principle places such a tight rein on the
discretion of a court as to render it unable to deal justly with the prob-
lem of forum shopping.46
Their Honours applied the ‘real and substantial connection’ test to
determine the more appropriate forum for the issues to be resolved,47
leading them to dissent in the actual result by favouring a stay of
proceedings in the case.
These divisions were also apparent in the other leading Australian
case, Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd.48 There five members of the
High Court49 accepted the approach of Deane and Gaudron JJ in
Oceanic Sun, by approving of and applying the ‘clearly inappropriate
forum’ test to forum non conveniens applications.50 The joint reasons
rejected the narrow traditional ‘vexatious or oppressive’ test, applied
in St Pierre and by Brennan J in Oceanic Sun, because it could achieve
extreme results where a chosen forum might have little or no connec-
tion with the parties and be an expensive place in which to litigate, but
which nevertheless did not meet the definition of ‘oppressive’ or
‘vexatious’—in other words, the test was too strict.
They also considered and rejected the Spiliada approach. While
admitting that there was much to be said for it in terms of the balance
of convenience, it could also lead to uncertainty in that often more
than one jurisdiction might have claims to be ‘more appropriate’. The
joint reasons noted that the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test they
favoured ‘[f]ocuses on the advantages and disadvantages arising from
a continuation of the proceedings in the selected forum rather than on
46 Ibid. at 212.
47 Ibid. at 217.
48 (1990) 171 CLR 538.
49 Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ in a joint judgment, with Brennan J
agreeing with the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test (ibid. at 572) and abandoning
his view in Oceanic. Toohey J (dissenting) adhered to his position in Oceanic, that
the ‘more appropriate forum’ test should be applied.
50 As the court found in Spiliada, the court found in Voth that a similar approach
would be taken to cases where the defendant was served within the jurisdiction,
and sought to have its exercise stayed as a matter of discretion, and cases where
the plaintiff sought leave to effect service outside the jurisdiction. However, the
onus of proof would be on the defendant in the former case and the plaintiff in
the latter case.
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the need to make a comparative judgment between the two
forums’.51
The joint reasons concede that considerations relating to the suit-
ability of the alternative forum are relevant to the examination of the
appropriateness or inappropriateness of the selected forum, and the
availability of relief in the foreign forum is a relevant factor in decid-
ing whether or not the local forum is clearly inappropriate.
One of the aspects of the Spiliada approach drew criticism in the
joint reasons. This was the comment by Lord Goff that in applying
the ‘more appropriate forum’ test, the fact that the plaintiff would not
obtain ‘justice’ in the foreign jurisdiction was a relevant factor. The
joint reasons found that there were ‘[p]owerful policy considerations
which militate against Australian courts sitting in judgment upon the
ability or willingness of the courts of another country to accord justice
to the plaintiff in the particular case’.52
The joint reasons concluded that the court was not in a position to
evaluate the justice or relative merits of the substantive laws of the
available fora. However, in applying the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’
test, the relevant connecting factors and legitimate personal or jurid-
ical advantage of which the court spoke in Spiliada were relevant.53
They claimed that there would be little practical difference between
the application of the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test and ‘more
appropriate forum’ test.54
The joint reasons rejected arguments that they should adopt the
Spiliada approach to improve consistency in approach in the common
law world, or among a large number of countries. They accepted that
if the Spiliada principle had commanded general acceptance, that
would be a relevant factor in their decision. They then specifically
referred to Canada and the US as applying different approaches to
Spiliada. Hence, there was no international consensus on the ap-
proach to be applied.55 The joint reasons also confirmed that the same
approach should be taken to stay applications as to applications for
leave to serve process outside the jurisdiction.56 Further, they con-
ceded it was possible that the Australian court might declare itself to
51 Above n. 48 at 558.
52 Ibid. at 559.
53 Ibid. at 565.
54 Ibid. at 558; again this is open to question, with Richard Garnett finding that in
subsequent cases where the Voth test was applied, overwhelmingly the
application for stay was refused. As he concludes: ‘any test which professes
almost to ignore one half of the equation (the foreign forum) in inter-jurisdictional
conflicts is unlikely to yield the same results as one which takes into account, on a
relatively equal basis, the claims of both jurisdictions’: Richard Garnett, ‘Stay of
Proceedings in Australia: A Clearly Inappropriate Test?’ (1999) 23 Melbourne
University Law Review 30 at 36.
55 Above n. 48 at 560–1.
56 Ibid. at 563; and that in applying the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test,
identification of the substantive law to be applied was an important factor, but not
determinative of itself (ibid. at 566). Where the relevant court rules refer to a
court’s ability to stay proceedings on the basis that the court ‘is an inappropriate
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be a clearly inappropriate forum, although there was no other appro-
priate forum, and hence the plaintiff would be left without any poss-
ibility of a remedy.57
The High Court confirmed that the question of which law would
apply to resolve the dispute was an important factor in considering
forum non conveniens applications. It should not, however, be con-
sidered to the exclusion of all other factors.58 This is consistent with
the increasing willingness of the courts in Australia and elsewhere to
apply foreign law.59 Consistently with this approach, the court has
taken into account, in assessing forum non conveniens applications,
the fact that mandatory laws of the forum might apply to the
dispute.60
In some subsequent decisions where more than one proceeding is
commenced in more than one jurisdiction in relation to identical or
substantially identical issues, the Australian courts have applied the
question of whether the Australian proceedings are vexatious or op-
pressive.61 The majority held that it was prima facie vexatious or
oppressive to commence such proceedings if an action is already
pending in relation to the same matters in issue.
one’, the court has said that the same concepts and considerations inform, and in
the same way, the test of ‘inappropriate forum’ in that context as those informing
the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ according to Voth: Regie Nationale Renault v
Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491 at 503, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and
Hayne JJ; over the dissents of Kirby J who believed that where there was a
difference between legislation and the common law, it was a mistake to presume
the difference was unintended or mistaken (above n. 48 at 544), and Callinan J:
‘the word “inappropriate” must have been deliberately chosen by the rule makers
. . . had they intended a test of vexation and oppression then they could and
should have said so’ (above n. 48 at 565).
57 Above n. 48 at 558; this point was reiterated recently by the New South Wales
Court of Appeal in Garsec Pty Ltd v His Majesty The Sultan of Brunei [2008]
NSWCA 211; however, Spigelman CJ found the fact that the Australian forum
was practically the only forum in which relief was available was ‘generally entitled
to significant weight’ (ibid. at 686). In her empirical work, Mary Keyes found, of
the cases studied, that of seven cases in which there was no alternative forum
available or proven, a stay on forum non conveniens grounds was refused in each
case; while where the defendant identified an alternative forum, the court granted
the stay in 25 per cent of cases studied: Keyes, above n. 9 at 173.
58 Above n. 48 at 566; in her empirical study Mary Keyes found that identification of
the substantive law was statistically significant in determining forum non
conveniens applications: Keyes, above n. 9 at 170.
59 Regie Nationale Renault v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491 at 508.
60 Akai v People’s Insurance Co (1996) 188 CLR 418, although in that case the court
in so doing controversially overrode a jurisdiction agreement made by the parties.
61 CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345; Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR
571. The court claimed in CSR that in such cases the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’
test is not to be used (at 400). Similar principles apply in the case of anti-suit
injunctions as forum non conveniens applications: Reid Mortensen, ‘Duty Free
Forum Shopping: Disputing Venue in the Pacific’ (2001) 32 Victoria University of
Wellington Law Review 673.
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Members of the High Court applied the ‘oppressive/vexatious’ test
in Regie Nationale Renault v Zhang62 while also quoting Voth.63 In
Zhang, the court also suggested that questions of public policy might
be relevant to forum non conveniens applications.64
The High Court has confirmed that, in cases where the cross-
vesting scheme is relevant, different principles apply:65
In the context of the cross-vesting Act, one is not concerned with the
problem of a court, with a prima facie duty to exercise a jurisdiction that
has been regularly invoked, asking whether it is justified in refusing to
perform that duty. Rather, the court is required by statute to ensure that
cases are heard in the forum dictated by the interests of justice . . . There
is a statutory requirement to exercise the power of transfer whenever it
appears that it is in the interests of justice that it should be exercised. It
is not necessary that it should appear that the first court is a ‘clearly
inappropriate’ forum. It is both necessary and sufficient that, in the
interests of justice, the second court is more appropriate.66
The court confirmed that a weighing of considerations of cost, ex-
pense and inconvenience, required by the cross-vesting legislation,
was a familiar task for courts.67 In that case, a majority decided that
the proceedings, commenced in New South Wales, should be trans-
ferred to South Australia. Relevant factors included the question of
the applicable law; it reflected the legitimate expectations of the
parties and the policy reflected in the cross-vesting legislation, and
the witnesses would be mainly drawn from South Australia. Callinan J
noted of the litigation in that case that it involved the
sort of litigation which will inevitably be provoked whenever a legis-
lature, by ambitious long-arm legislation, or a court by too expansive a
view of its own powers, or the powers of another court of the same
polity, encourages or assists plaintiffs to pursue claims in a non-natural
forum.68
62 Zhang, above n. 59 at 521, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne
JJ; see also Dow Jones and Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575.
63 Kirby J in dissent would have applied the Spiliada approach (Zhang, above n. 59
at 524). Callinan J stated that oppression/vexation should not be applied to the
test (ibid. at 564), and that at least on these facts dealing with a state’s civil
procedure rules, the ‘more appropriate forum’ test should be applied.
64 ‘To the extent that the first limb of [the rule in Phillips v Eyre] was intended to
operate as a technique of forum control, we should frankly recognise that the
question is about public policy’ (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and
Hayne JJ) (Zhang, above n. 59 at 515). The joint reasons stated that if a question
were to arise about whether public policy considerations direct that an action not
be maintained in Australia, the question should be resolved as a preliminary issue
on an application for a permanent stay.
65 BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400.
66 Ibid. at 421, Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ (dissenting in the actual result).
67 Ibid. at 423, Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ.
68 Ibid. at 494.
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V. American Authorities
The basis of jurisdiction was originally personal service within the
jurisdiction,69 to be supplemented by a minimum contacts approach in
International Shoe Co v Washington.70 In other words, the courts of
a jurisdiction could assert jurisdiction over a dispute if there were
some minimum contacts between the dispute and the jurisdiction
such that the assertion of jurisdiction did not offend traditional no-
tions of fair play or substantive justice.71 A reasonableness standard
has been added in international cases.72 This trend is quite similar to
the Canadian position, where presence within the jurisdiction has
been supplemented by a ‘real and substantial connection’ test in rela-
tion to jurisdiction questions.73
Though there is some evidence of the application of forum non
conveniens principles in early cases,74 the current doctrine is often
sourced to an influential article written by a lawyer in 1929,75 which
was adopted by the US Supreme Court in 1947 in its Gulf Oil v Gil-
bert76 decision.
There a Virginian resident sued in a New York court a Pennsylvania
corporation operating in Virginia, claiming negligence in relation to a
69 Pennoyer v Neff 95 US 714 (1877).
70 326 US 310 (1945); as applied in cases such as Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior
Court of California 480 US 102 (1987) where relevant factors were stated to include
the burden on the defendant, interests of the forum state, the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interests of the states in
furthering substantive social policies.
71 See now the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, which in respect of
disputes with international aspects provides for a range of factors to be
considered when an American court is asked to exercise jurisdiction, including
the link of the activity to the territory of the regulatory state, connections between
the state and those the regulation is designed to protect, the kind of activity to be
regulated, existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation, importance of the regulation to the international political, legal or
economic system, the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the
traditions of the international system, the extent to which another state may have
an interest in regulation of the activity, and the likelihood of conflict with
regulation of another state: Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States (1987).
72 Asahi, above n. 70.
73 Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077; s. 10 of the Uniform
Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act; see Tanya Monestier, ‘A “Real
and Substantial Mess”: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada’ (2008) 33 Queen’s Law
Journal 179.
74 See for example Willendson v Forsoket 29 F. Cas 1283 at 1284 (D. Pa. 1801) (No.
17,682); however, generally the judex tenetur impertiri judicium suum approach
was favoured in early cases, that a court with jurisdiction over a case was bound
to decide it: see for example Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v Virginia 19 US (6
Wheat.) 264 at 404 (1821).
75 Paxton Blair, ‘The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law’
(1929) 29 Columbia Law Review 1.
76 Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert 330 US 501 (1947); most states have adopted this approach
to forum non conveniens but not all: David Robertson and Paula Speck, ‘Access to
State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and
Antisuit Injunctions’ (1990) 68 Texas Law Review 937 at 950–1.
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fire in the plaintiff’s Virginian premises. The defendant sought a stay
of the proceedings on the basis of forum non conveniens, and eventu-
ally the Supreme Court found that a stay should have been given. The
court started with the position that unless the balance was strongly in
favour of the defendant, a plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be
disturbed lightly. It provided a list of factors relevant to the decision:
(a) private interests of the litigants: relative ease of access to
sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for at-
tendance of unwilling witnesses; the cost of obtaining the
attendance of willing witnesses; the possibility of view of prem-
ises if appropriate; the enforceability of any judgment obtained;
and all other practical problems that would make trial of a case
easy, expeditious and inexpensive;
(b) public interest factors such as the administrative difficulties
associated with congested court centres and the existence of
jury duty might suggest that it not be imposed on a community
with little relation to the litigation; there is good reason to hold
a trial in the view of those to whom the case most closely
touches, and a local interest in having localized controversies at
home; the applicable law was also a relevant factor.77
The plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed, but the
plaintiff could not vex, harass or oppress the defendant with a choice
not necessary to the case. There is an aspect of proportionality
applied when considering the plaintiff’s convenience as against the
extent to which proceedings in the forum of choice would oppress or
vex the defendant.78
In 1948, the US Code was introduced, relevantly providing in sec-
tion 1404(a) of Title 28 for the transfer of proceedings from one
American court to another, for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses, and the interests of justice. This provision has been widely
used, and has had the practical effect that the common law rules of
forum non conveniens now only apply in the US to international
cases.79 It is sometimes said that the introduction of this Code helped
77 The majority also found that the doctrine is only considered where jurisdiction to
hear the matter exists, a principle overturned recently in Sinochem International
Co v Malaysia International Shipping Corp 127 S Ct 1184 (2007); see J. Stanton
Hill, ‘Towards Global Convenience, Fairness and Judicial Economy: An Argument
in Support of Conditional Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals Before Determining
Jurisdiction in United States Federal District Courts’ (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal
of Transnational Law 1177.
78 Gulf Oil, above n. 76 at 508–9.
79 It is easier to obtain a transfer pursuant to the Code than a stay pursuant to forum
non conveniens: Norwood v Kirkpatrick 349 US 29 (1955).
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further liberalize the American courts’ attitude to forum non con-
veniens in international cases.80
In subsequent cases, it has been confirmed that the doctrine would
favour a stay where trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum would impose
a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff
cannot provide any specific reasons of convenience supporting their
choice. However, the mere fact that the law in the other forum is less
favourable to the plaintiff is not relevant.81 In some cases, the fact that
the plaintiff would receive a much reduced damages award if forced
to litigate overseas has been taken into account,82 but generally courts
have insisted that something more is required, such as the influence of
the military on the alternative forum,83 or that the alternative forum
would provide no remedy at all.84
Perhaps as a result of these legislative amendments, the next forum
non conveniens case that reached the US Supreme Court was Piper
Aircraft Co v Reyno. There Scottish plaintiffs sued defendants resident
in Ohio and Pennsylvania arising from a plane crash in Scotland. The
plaintiffs were alleging negligence in aspects of the construction of
the plane. The court clarified that it was not appropriate to refuse a
forum non conveniens application merely because the law applicable
in the alternative forum was less generous to the plaintiff, unless
the remedy was clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory. It confirmed that
the principles relating to forum non conveniens were different from
the requirements of section 1404, and more difficult to prove. While,
consistently with Gulf Oil, the availability of an alternative forum was
a relevant factor and the plaintiff’s choice of forum was to be given
respect, this ‘respect’ was of lesser importance when the plaintiff was
a non-resident of the jurisdiction chosen. The court seemed to shift
from an abuse of process approach to a balance of convenience or
most suitable forum approach, compared with Gulf Oil. Despite
80 David Robertson, ‘Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather
Fantastic Fiction”’ (1987) 103 Law Quarterly Review 398 at 404.
81 Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno (1981) 454 US 235; the court also noted in this case that
the presumption in favour of the plaintiff had less weight when the plaintiff was a
non-United States resident, and that forum non conveniens stays were subject to
different principles than transfers between federal courts pursuant to 28 USC
1404(a), and principles applicable to transfers in such cases (including whether
the applicable law changed) were not relevant in forum non conveniens
applications; cf Robertson, above n. 80 at 417, who argues that the principles are
virtually identical. The principles were applied also in American Dredging
Company v Miller (1994) 510 US 443 and Sinochemical International Co v Malaysia
International Shipping Corp 127 S Ct 1184 (2007). In the latter case, the court
confirmed that an action could be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds
without considering whether prima facie jurisdiction exists.
82 Lehman v Humphrey Cayman Ltd 713 F. 2d 339 at 346 (8th Cir, 1983); Irish
National Insurance Co v Aer Lingus Teoranta 739 F. 2d 90 (2nd Cir, 1984).
83 Dawson v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guine´e 746 F. 2d 1466 (3rd Cir), aff’g 593 F.
Supp 20 (D. Del 1984).
84 Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno 454 US 235 at 254 (1981).
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trenchant criticism,85 these continue to be the principles applied in
forum non conveniens applications in the US.86
VI. Critique of Australian Approach
There are, with respect, many difficulties with the current Australian
position in this area. I highlight the most important deficiencies, in my
view, below.
i. Confusion as to Whether the ‘Vexatious or Oppressive’ Test is
Still Applicable or Not
A reading of the Australian cases does not provide a clear answer to
the question of whether the ‘vexatious or oppressive’ test for declin-
ing jurisdiction is still applicable or not. While, as indicated, the cases
prior to Oceanic applied this test, and Brennan J in Oceanic continued
to apply the test, Wilson and Toohey JJ in that case rejected the test.
Deane J did not reject it, but connected it with his test of ‘clearly
inappropriate forum’—that proceedings continued in a clearly inap-
propriate forum would be oppressive or vexatious.
However, in Voth the joint reasons clearly present a different
position, contrasting the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test with the
‘traditional’ test, by which they clearly are referring to the ‘vexatious
or oppressive’ test. We know this because the joint reasons contain
the following statement:
The content of the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test is more expansive
than the traditional test applied by Brennan J. The former test, unlike the
latter, recognises that in some situations the continuation of an action in
the selected forum, though not amounting to vexation or oppression or
an abuse of process, will amount to injustice . . . the clearly inappropri-
ate test is to be preferred to the traditional test.87
At this stage, it seemed that the ‘vexatious or oppressive’ test had
been discarded by the High Court. However, in later cases involving
proceedings in more than one jurisdiction, the court has again used
85 The Supreme Court of Washington refused to apply this aspect of the Piper
Aircraft decision, claiming it ‘raised concerns about xenophobia’: Myers v Boeing
Co 794 P. 2d 1272 at 1281 (Wash. 1990); see also Peter Carney, ‘International
Forum Non Conveniens: Section 1404.5: A Proposal in the Interest of Sovereignty,
Comity and Individual Justice’ (1996) 45 American University Law Review 415;
Allan Stein, ‘Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access
Doctrine’ (1985) 133 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 781; Martin Davies,
‘Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis’ (2003) 77 Tulane
Law Review 309.
86 American Dredging Co v Miller 510 US 443 (1994); Sinochem International Co v
Malaysia International Shipping Corp 127 S Ct 1184 (2007); stays are often granted
on conditions, e.g. regarding submission to a foreign jurisdiction: John Bies,
‘Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens’ (2000) 67 University of Chicago Law
Review 490.
87 Voth, above n. 48 at 556–7, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ.
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the test of ‘vexatious or oppressive’.88 Further, in one case where this
was the situation, CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd, the court
said that in such cases the ‘vexatious or oppressive’ test, rather than
the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test, should apply. This is contrary to
the decision of Deane J in Oceanic, on which Voth was based, who
said that proceedings in a clearly inappropriate forum would be
oppressive or vexatious. He was able to reconcile his test with the
‘traditional’ test, while the joint reasons in CSR dismantle the ‘clearly
inappropriate forum’ test from that context. The joint reasons in CSR
do not provide reasons why, in that particular situation involving
multiple proceedings in multiple jurisdictions, the ‘clearly inappropri-
ate forum’ test is not satisfactory or even relevant. It is submitted that
it would be an acceptable application of the ‘clearly inappropriate
forum’ test to say that if proceedings on identical or substantially
identical matters had already been commenced elsewhere, this fact
may make a local forum clearly inappropriate. Instead, further compli-
cation has been introduced by arguably re-grafting the ‘old’ test on.
While some have argued that these cases must be developed as an
express exception to the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test,89 unfortu-
nately since then the court has applied the ‘vexatious or oppressive
test’ to cases not involving proceedings in more than one jurisdic-
tion,90 over the objections of dissentients.91
This has occurred in spite of the fact that in Voth the court adopted
and applied the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test and did not ask
whether the proceedings challenged were vexatious or oppressive. In
fact the joint reasons specifically rejected the ‘traditional’ test—‘since
the traditional test is apt to produce such an extreme result, the
“clearly inappropriate test” is to be preferred’.92 Their comments at
the previous page clearly show that when they refer to the ‘traditional’
test they are referring to the ‘vexatious or oppressive’ test:
The content of the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test is more expansive
than the traditional test applied by Brennan J. The former test, unlike the
latter, recognises that in some situations the continuation of an action in
the selected forum, though not amounting to vexation or oppression or
an abuse of process in the strict sense, will amount to injustice . . .93
In justifying this approach of applying the ‘vexatious/oppressive’ test
to such cases, the High Court in CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia
88 CSR, above n. 61 at 391, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and
Kirby JJ; Zhang, above n. 59 at 521, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow
and Hayne JJ. It is possible that the words now have a different meaning than
they did in the ‘old’ test but if this is the intention, it surely would have been
preferable to use different words to avoid confusion.
89 Garnett, above n. 54 at 60.
90 Zhang, above n. 59 at 521, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and
Hayne JJ.
91 Ibid. Kirby J (at 524) and Callinan J (at 564).
92 Ibid. at 557.
93 Ibid. at 556.
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Ltd quoted the joint reasons in Voth that the ‘traditional power to stay
proceedings . . . is to be exercised in accordance with the general
principle empowering a court to dismiss or stay proceedings which
are oppressive, vexatious or an abuse of process’.94 However, one
problem with using this justification is that, two pages later, the joint
reasons in Voth reject this ‘traditional’ approach in favour of the
‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test.95 Perhaps the clearest evidence of
the difference between the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test and the
‘vexatious/oppressive’ approach is that in the joint reasons there is a
heading ‘Comparison Between the Clearly Inappropriate Test and the
Traditional Test’,96 as well as Brennan J’s judgment in Voth where he
expressly abandons his adoption of the ‘vexatious/oppressive’ test in
favour of the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test.97
Further, in the CSR case the court was faced with parallel proceed-
ings in different jurisdictions, where the issues partly differed. The
court said that in such cases:
The question is not whether the Australian court is a clearly inappropri-
ate forum for the litigation of the issues involved in the Australian pro-
ceedings. Rather the question must be whether . . . the Australian
proceedings are vexatious or oppressive in the Voth sense of those
terms, namely that they are productive of serious and unjustified trouble
and harassment, or seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or
damaging.98
In Henry v Henry, where the court again sought to apply the ‘clearly
inappropriate forum’ test, the joint reasons included these
comments:
If the orders of the foreign court will be recognised in Australia, it will
be relevant to consider whether any orders may need to be enforced in
other countries, and if so, the relative ease with which that can be done.
As well, it will be relevant to consider which forum can provide more
effectively for complete resolution of the matters involved in the parties’
controversy . . . It will also be relevant to consider the connection of
the parties and their marriage with each of the jurisdictions and to
have regard to the issues on which relief might depend in those jurisdic-
tions . . . It will be relevant to consider whether, having regard to their
resources and their understanding of language, the parties are able to
participate in the respective proceedings on an equal footing.99
94 CSR, above n. 61 at 391, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and
Kirby JJ, quoting Voth, above n. 48 at 554. These comments were quoted in the
joint reasons in Zhang, above n. 59 at 502.
95 Voth, above n. 48 at 556.
96 Ibid. at 556.
97 ‘As I think it is more important that a test be authoritatively settled than that I
adhere to the test I prefer, and as any such test is judge-made law, I add my
acceptance of the test proposed by the majority’ (ibid. at 572). Brennan J also
clearly believed the tests were different.
98 CSR, above n. 61 at 400–1.
99 Henry, above n. 61 at 592–3, Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
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This reasoning arguably shows the difficulties with the ‘clearly in-
appropriate forum’ test and its focus on the jurisdiction chosen. The
above passage suggests that a comparison must be undertaken, at
least where proceedings are pending in more than one jurisdiction, of
the relative claims of each jurisdiction. This is clearly a process more
consonant with the ‘more appropriate forum’ test than the ‘clearly
inappropriate forum’ test.100
It is submitted that the High Court in Voth was correct in rejecting
the ‘oppressive and vexatious’ test as too strict in determining forum
non conveniens questions, for the reasons it gave in that case, and for
the reasons given by the British judges. Such concepts, as well as
escaping easy definition as the judges have pointed out, set the bar for
a stay at too high a level, allowing the possibility101 of forum shopping
and showing undue preference for the plaintiff’s chosen forum. To the
extent that they have pejorative overtones in relation to a plaintiff’s
choice, they are inappropriate—it may simply be that there is a ‘better’
forum in the sense of a better fit with the parties and issues involved
in the case, without the need to cast aspersions on the plaintiff’s
choice. The test implies a presumption of the correctness of the plain-
tiff’s choice, a presumption open to question and not applied in all
such cases, as will be seen. The difficulty is that it has not consistently
applied its own decision in Voth since then, with evidence of this
concept creeping back into discussion about forum non conveniens. It
is suggested that the High Court should re-affirm its rejection of the
‘oppressive or vexatious’ test.
ii. Are the Spiliada Factors Relevant to the ‘Clearly Inappropriate
Forum’ Test?
The joint reasons in Voth contend that in the application of the ‘clearly
inappropriate forum’ test, the discussion by Lord Goff in Spiliada of
relevant connecting factors and a legitimate personal or juridical ad-
vantage were valuable102 and should be utilized. It is submitted that
this claim is highly contentious.
Earlier in the judgment, the joint reasons stated (correctly, with
respect) that its preferred test focused on the advantages and dis-
advantages arising from a continuation of the proceedings in the
100 The point is also made by Garnett, above n. 54 at 53–4. Mary Keyes calls it
‘incompatible with the fundamental basis of the forum non conveniens principle’:
Keyes, above n. 9 at 115.
101 The extent to which it is a reality depends on factors such as the choice of law
rules used, the court’s attitude to substance and procedure, public policy and
renvoi. Some of these issues remain unsettled in Australia at the present time and
the extent to which the High Court’s re-use of the ‘vexatious or oppressive’ test
will in fact promote forum shopping depends on its approach to these other
factors.
102 Voth, above n. 48 at 564–5.
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chosen forum rather than the need to make a comparative judgment
between the two fora.103
Yet Spiliada calls for a balancing exercise which necessitates mak-
ing a comparative judgment—which jurisdiction has the closer con-
nection to the dispute, the parties, the evidence etc., as well as any
legitimate personal or juridical advantages to the plaintiff in litigating
in the forum. The word ‘advantage’ clearly is a relative one, calling for
a comparison between at least two things. It seems unreal to claim
that this process does not involve a comparative judgment when
clearly it does, and not surprisingly, these claims have been criticized
by leading commentators.104
It is submitted to be unduly narrow to focus, as Voth does, only on
the inappropriateness or otherwise of the chosen forum. Richard
Garnett criticizes the Voth approach as myopic, focusing only on the
appropriateness of the local forum, while ignoring the claims of a
foreign forum:105
The High Court may well decide to depart from Voth completely in the
near future, due to a realisation that its principles are too rigid and
narrow to deal with the variety of situations that can arise in trans-
national disputes. In particular, it may be argued that a test which states
that interjurisdictional disputes should be resolved only by focusing
upon the appropriateness of the local forum is excessively myopic.
Surely the claim of a foreign jurisdiction to trial of a matter is entitled to
recognition which is at least equal to that of the forum and any decision
on the place of litigation which fails to accord this will serve only to
foster a lack of respect and disharmony between courts . . . Domestic
courts can no longer see themselves as only having a responsibility to
develop the law of a particular country. Now, with the expansion of
international trade and commerce, they must act as part of an integrated
global network of adjudication. It is submitted that the adoption of the
more appropriate forum test in Australia would better accord with this
objective.
The author agrees with these comments, and they give the lie to any
claim that the Spiliada balancing factors are somehow to be used in
the application of the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test.
103 Ibid. at 558; this feature is also noted by Richard Garnett: ‘the clearly
inappropriate forum test focuses only [emphasis added] upon the suitability of the
local jurisdiction’: Garnett, above n. 54 at 34; and by Mary Keyes, ‘Voth . . . makes
it plain that the principle of forum non conveniens should not involve a
comparative evaluation’ (Keyes, above n. 9 at 107).
104 As Mary Keyes says, ‘it is difficult to see why Deane J [in Oceanic] thought that
factors relevant to a balancing exercise concerned with identifying connections to
a number of forums, with a view to determining on balance which forum is more
appropriate, could be relevant to deciding whether the local forum is clearly
inappropriate’: Keyes, above n. 9 at 104. She concludes that there are major
differences between the test the High Court claims it is applying and what it is
actually doing in forum non conveniens cases, finding the manner of the High
Court’s approach ‘alarming’ (ibid. at 138).
105 Garnett, above n. 54 at 64.
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Given this unsatisfactory test, it is not surprising that in subsequent
cases a different approach has been taken. In Henry v Henry, the court
clearly engaged in a comparison of the appropriateness of two poss-
ible fora—in its own words:
it will be relevant to consider which forum can provide more effectively
for complete resolution of the matters involved in the parties’ contro-
versy . . . It will be relevant to consider the connection of the parties and
their marriage to each of the jurisdictions and to have regard to the
issues on which relief might depend in those jurisdictions.106
The High Court at least acknowledged the apparent contradiction
between its comments and that of Voth, with a footnote of the judg-
ment stating: ‘note, however, the statement in Voth to the effect that
Australian courts should not concern themselves with an assessment
of the comparative procedural or other claims of the foreign
forum’.107
No attempt is made to reconcile the apparently contradictory posi-
tions, and this may be because it is not possible to do so. The High
Court must be given credit for expressly acknowledging the incon-
sistency, but arguably should now act to address it by discarding the
‘clearly inappropriate’ test in Voth. Arguments that a different test
applies when there are proceedings on foot elsewhere are not
convincing—such a situation could be dealt with through lis alibi
pendens, and it is not clear at the level of principle why a different
legal test is necessary to considering stays, depending on whether
proceedings have or have not been commenced elsewhere. It is sub-
mitted that it is possible to develop one test to deal with both
possibilities—for example, to apply a test of ‘more appropriate forum’,
recognizing that the fact that proceedings have in fact been com-
menced elsewhere is evidence of the existence of a more appropriate
forum.
iii. The ‘Clearly Inappropriate Forum’ Test Could Work Injustice
Let’s consider some real life factual examples that perhaps highlight
the potential of the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test to work injustice
in practice. Take, for example, the facts in Abdullahi v Pfizer Inc,108
where the Nigerian plaintiffs claimed they suffered injuries in Nigeria
due to drug trials carried out by the defendant (a US resident com-
pany) in Nigeria. The evidence suggested that the Nigerian courts
were affected by corruption, inefficiency, delay and understaffing, and
that they had no interest in the outcome of the case. Let’s assume now
that Pfizer was an Australian resident, and the action was commenced
in Australia. It is submitted that it would be wrong for an Australian
court, in assessing any forum non conveniens application, not to take
106 Henry, above n. 61 at 592.
107 Ibid.
108 77 F. App’x 48 (2nd Cir, 2003).
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into account the situation of the prime alternative forum, namely
Nigeria, with its attendant difficulties described above. Yet this is what
the clearly inappropriate forum, with its focus on the chosen forum
rather than a consideration of any alternative fora, would require.109
The same thing may be observed in the Lubbe110 litigation, where
plaintiffs were allegedly injured in South Africa arising from business
carried on by a British parent company. Action was commenced in
Britain. In resolving the forum non conveniens application, the court
considered the reality that no South African law firm would have the
resources to undertake the litigation, given the large number of plain-
tiffs, their lack of funding, and the lack of legal aid type funding.
Again, the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test would not take these
matters into account if the action were commenced in Australia
against an Australian parent company, involving the same circum-
stances. It is submitted that this would lead to an incomplete inquiry
with potentially disastrous results for the plaintiffs involved.
It is interesting that Keyes’ empirical study, admittedly from a
limited base, found that of the cases studied, where there was no
alternative forum available, the court on every occasion found the
Australian forum to be not ‘clearly inappropriate’, while when an
alternative forum was identified, the stay was granted in 25 per cent
of cases.111 This actual pattern is surely more consistent with the
Spiliada approach, which considers the availability of an alternative
forum as relevant to a stay application, than the Voth approach, which
states that such a factor is not relevant. While wary of the dangers of
generalizing from a small sample size, this might suggest that al-
though the Voth test does not call for a comparison of fora or assess-
ment of the relative merits of each, the judges are in effect conducting
this Spiliada-like comparison (such a comparison being on the record
in Henry and Akai, perhaps implicitly in other cases) with a view to
having the matter heard (somewhere), but they do so in spite of the
Voth test rather than as a faithful application of it. This suggests that
the test is in need of reform.
iv. Links With Australia May Well be Tenuous
Given that it is more difficult for a defendant to show that the chosen
Australian forum is ‘clearly inappropriate’ than it is for them to show
that there is another ‘more appropriate forum’, it is not surprising
that the results have been that matters are heard in Australian courts
although there is only a tenuous link with Australia. Examples include
109 Richard Garnett has also made the point: ‘while the availability of an alternative
forum and whether it would give the plaintiff adequate relief will be relevant to
determining whether the local forum is clearly inappropriate, it [is] possible
(according to the majority) that an Australian forum could conceivably be found
to be “clearly inappropriate” even if no other forum [is] available to the plaintiff’:
Garnett, above n. 54 at 34–5.
110 Lubbe and Cape Plc [2000] UKHL 41.
111 Keyes, above n. 9 at 173.
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Al-Ru Farm Pty Ltd v Hedleys Humpers Ltd,112 where a local plaintiff
was held to be able to sue a foreign shipper of goods; although the
facts on which the cause of action was based occurred in England, it
was likely that English law would apply, and almost all witnesses were
based in England. The only apparent factor connecting the matter
with Australia was that the goods were now here.
Further, in Phosphate Co-operative Company of Australia Ltd v SGS
Supervision Services Inc,113 an Australian importer of goods was able
to sue for negligence in Australia a Canadian company for inspection
of a ship that would have brought the goods to Australia. Canadian
law would likely apply to the situation, and most of the significant
evidence would come from there. In WFM Motors Pty Ltd v Mayd-
well,114 the case involved a guarantee made in Hong Kong and to
which Hong Kong law would likely apply. The court refused a stay
from the matter continuing in a New South Wales court because the
issues involved were ‘very simple’.
One would have to doubt the extent to which Australia should be
interested in the above litigation. All of them involved the application
of foreign law, and most of the facts on which the claims were based
were overseas, as was relevant evidence. Some might suggest that the
courts were unduly concerned to assist an Australian plaintiff by al-
lowing them a forum to sue here, despite the lack of any other real
connection to this jurisdiction.
v. Comity
It is trite to observe that one of the objectives of the rules of private
international law is to achieve, as far as possible, the goal of comity
among different nations.115 The High Court itself has confirmed that:
Considerations of comity and restraint, to which reference has so often
been made in cases concerning service out of the jurisdiction, will
often be of greatest relevance in considering questions of forum non
conveniens.116
If comity is such an important factor in forum non conveniens, it is
submitted that logic would suggest that the ‘more appropriate forum’
test is more consistent with comity than the ‘clearly inappropriate
112 [1991] SASC 2721.
113 [1993] FCA 151.
114 Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 23 April 1993, Bryson J.
115 Comity has been defined as ‘neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws’: Hilton v Guyot 159 US 113 at 163–4 (1895).
116 Agar, above n. 10 at 571, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.
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forum’ test.117 The ‘more appropriate forum’ test, by design, considers
the claims of another jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter,
while the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test, at least on its face, ignores
the foreign jurisdiction and concentrates on the merits of the local
forum. Lord Diplock in The ‘Abidin Daver’, in reflecting on British
developments including the liberalization evident in MacShannon v
Rockware Glass, stated that ‘judicial chauvinism has been replaced by
judicial comity’.118 Kirby J in Regie Nationale Renault v Zhang claimed
the Spiliada approach was ‘harmonious with the rules of public inter-
national law as well as with comity’.119 Thus the principle of comity
provides another reason why the current test used by the High Court
of Australia should be discarded.
vi. Mismatch Between Statutory Court Rules and Common Law
Rules
Further complexity arises because the rules of some Australian courts
provide expressly for the power of courts to stay proceedings and set
aside process on grounds similar to the common law doctrine of
forum non conveniens. For example, the Victorian rule allows a stay
where the state is not a ‘convenient forum’.120 The New South Wales
rule allows a stay where the state is an ‘inappropriate forum’.121
Where the proceedings involve merely interstate elements and the
cross-vesting provisions apply, the test for transfer is whether the
other court is ‘more appropriate’.122
117 Garnett says the current test ‘fosters a lack of respect and disharmony between
courts’: Garnett, above n. 54 at 64. Reid Mortensen dismisses the High Court’s
current approach as ‘notoriously parochial’: ‘Troublesome and Obscure: The
Renewal of Renvoi in Australia’ (2006) 2(1) Journal of Private International Law 1 at
26. He concluded that the Voth test was not ‘adequately shaped’ to deal with
jurisdiction questions (‘Duty Free Forum Shopping: Disputing Venue in the
Pacific’ (2001) 32 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 673 at 678; ‘Comity
and Jurisdictional Restraint in Vanuatu’ (2002) 33 Victoria University of Wellington
Law Review 95).
118 [1984] AC 398 at 411.
119 Zhang, above n. 59 at 524.
120 Rule 7.05, Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic); the Northern
Territory rule also refers to ‘convenience’: Rule 7.05, Supreme Court Rules (NT); in
the Australian Capital Territory rules, there is provision for a Territory court to
hear a matter transferred from elsewhere only if it is ‘convenient’: Regulation
3307, Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT).
121 Rule 8.2, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
122 Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) s. 5(1) and (2); see Bankinvest
AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711 at 728 where the court found that this
implied a Spiliada approach. Relevant factors include the applicable law, forensic
procedures in each jurisdiction, connections to the forum chosen, the balance of
convenience to the parties and the court system generally: Dawson v Baker (1994)
120 ACTR 11 at 25. Refer for commentary to Keyes, above n. 9 at 245–8. See also
the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) which allows stays where a
court is satisfied that another court is ‘appropriate’ (s. 20(3)). Dicta of Gummow J
in BHP Billiton Limited v Schultz considering both the cross-vesting scheme and
the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) suggest that in both cases the
plaintiff’s choice is to be accorded no particular weight, and that the emphasis is
on identifying the more appropriate forum: above n. 65 at 438–9.
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While the precise tests differ across jurisdictions, it is clear that no
jurisdiction has legislated for the application of the ‘clearly inap-
propriate forum’ test that the High Court applied in Voth. While the
claim has been made that there is no substantive difference between
the ‘inappropriate forum’ test and the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’
test,123 other judges in Zhang dissented on this point, in terms with
which the author agrees:
Where a rule-maker, validly acting under statutory power, has spoken,
the law appears in that text, not in prior judicial utterances. To the extent
that there is a difference between the text and those utterances, it is a
rudimentary mistake for the decision maker to start from the presump-
tion that the difference is unintended or mistaken: indeed to start the
task of expounding the applicable law anywhere else than in the text.124
It is submitted with respect that in the face of such a matrix of differ-
ent provisions, the High Court could do either of two things: 
(a) it should explain why there are good reasons for the continued
application of its common law interpretation of forum non con-
veniens (in effect now confined largely to international cases)
despite the different provisions in various rules of court as in-
terpreted. This might be because it is argued that an interstate
transfer of proceedings is easier and such an order less likely to
be outcome-determinative than a stay on Australian proceed-
ings in an international case, although the state provisions can
also apply to proceedings with international elements.
The alternative, and to the author at least, the preferred, approach
would be:
(b) to adapt the common law test of forum non conveniens to some-
thing more consistent with its statutory form, focusing on
which is the more appropriate forum, and in so doing consider-
ing the issue of convenience in relative terms. The alternative
a majority of the High Court has chosen, in effect to deny that
there is a difference between the two, is, as has been pointed
out, a very difficult argument to run when the words in the
relevant statutes are considered.
Of course, there is significant precedent for developments in statutory
law to cause a change in the direction of common law principles in
123 Zhang, above n. 59 at 503, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and
Hayne JJ.
124 Ibid. at 544, Kirby J; similarly Callinan J: ‘the word “inappropriate” which appears
in the relevant rule should not be burdened with the encrustations of
“oppressiveness” and “vexatiousness” that have been attached to it in cases in
which courts have decided an issue of forum non conveniens’ (ibid. at 563–4).
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many fields of law.125 In the context of private international law, one is
the Australian common law’s earlier position that limitation periods
were a question of procedure for the law of the forum,126 later contra-
dicted by statutory provision that limitation periods are substantive.127
This position was then reflected in a changed common law position to
the issue a short time later.128
VII. Critique of ‘More Appropriate Forum’ Standard
i. Generally
There has been substantial criticism of the ‘more appropriate forum’
standard, the broad approach taken in the UK and US (although, as
has been pointed out, there are substantial differences between the
approach of these two jurisdictions). Critics argue that the test is too
uncertain, given the broad range of factors to be considered. They
claim that the decision that a trial judge makes on the question of
forum non conveniens is often outcome-determinative, because a
plaintiff denied access to an American court often then drops their
action, for one reason or another.129 It is claimed the ‘vexatious/
oppressive’ test is easier to apply than a ‘more appropriate forum’
standard.130 The comments of the US Supreme Court that a relevant
factor in assessing a forum non conveniens application is the resid-
ency status of the plaintiff, specifically that it is more likely that an
action by a foreign plaintiff will be stayed than that of a local plain-
tiff,131 has attracted criticism that the principle is discriminatory,132
125 Two recent examples include the High Court decisions in Commonwealth v
Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471 (common law Crown immunities abolished by the
Constitution) and Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR
520 at 564 where the High Court found the common law of defamation needed to
yield to the requirements of a statute (the Constitution in that case).
126 McKain v R W Millar and Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 1.
127 Choice of Law (Limitation Periods) Act 1993 (NSW); Choice of Law (Limitation
Periods) Act 1993 (Vic); Choice of Law (Limitation Periods) Act 1996 (Qld);
Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA); Choice of Law (Limitation Periods) Act 1994
(WA); Limitation Act 1985 (ACT); Choice of Law (Limitation Periods) Act 1994
(NT).
128 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503.
129 Robertson, above n. 80, after surveying lawyers acting for plaintiffs who lost out
on a forum non conveniens application, found that almost half of the personal
injuries cases and 27 per cent of the commercial cases were subsequently
dropped.
130 Slater, above n. 25 at 569.
131 Piper Aircraft, above n. 81.
132 Alan Reed, ‘To Be or Not to Be: The Forum Non Conveniens Performance Acted
Out on Anglo-American Courtroom Stages’ (2001) 29 Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law 31 at 60.
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parochial133 or racist.134 It is said that by adopting such an approach,
the American courts are ‘implicitly condoning corporate malpractice,
negligence and harmful conduct’.135 The vast range of factors that a
court can consider in relation to such applications might mean that
there is inconsistency in application, standards and emphasis,136 or
what Stein describes as a ‘crazy quilt of ad hoc, capricious and incon-
sistent decisions’.137
It is often suggested that American resident defendants are too
easily able to avoid legal proceedings against them in the US by
pleading forum non conveniens.138 Exhibit A for this argument is often
the Union Carbide case,139 where lethal gas leaked from Union Car-
bide premises in India, killing more than 2,500 citizens. Many actions
were commenced in US courts against Union Carbide’s American
parent company. This company resisted these actions by arguing
forum non conveniens. The Indian legal system is notoriously slow,
and it was unlikely that the plaintiffs would practically have been able
to bring successful proceedings in an Indian court. The Indian Gov-
ernment in this case actually appeared at the forum non conveniens
stage, arguing that an American court should hear the matter. How-
ever, the court claimed the connections with America were few, and
outweighed by the Indian interest in applying Indian law and prin-
ciples to an incident that occurred in that country. Almost all of the
plaintiffs lived there, and almost all of the evidence (physical and
through witnesses) was also located there. Indian law would apply to
the claims. Galanter claims that the victims have still not received any
remedy, 15 years after the events.140 This leads some to suggest that
133 At least, as applied: Walter Heiser, ‘Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law:
The Impact of Applying Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions’ (2005) 51
Wayne Law Review 1161 at 1189.
134 Peter Prince, ‘Bhopal, Bougainville and Tedi: Why Australia’s Forum Non
Conveniens Approach is Better’ (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 573 at 573.
135 Reed, above n. 132 at 60. He suggests that American multinationals gravitate to
underdeveloped countries without regulatory infrastructure to ‘deal with the
dumping of harmful products’ (ibid. at 63).
136 Elizabeth Lear, ‘Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens:
Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power’ (2006) 91 Iowa Law Review 1147 at
1156; Davies, above n. 85 at 351; Robertson, above n. 129 at 414.
137 Stein, above n. 85 at 785.
138 Reed, above n. 132; Leah Nico, ‘From Local to Global: Reform of Forum Non
Conveniens Needed to Ensure Justice in the Era of Globalisation’ (2005) 11 South
Western Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 345.
139 809 F. 2d 195 (2nd Cir, 1987).
140 Mark Galanter, ‘Law’s Elusive Promise: Learning from Bhopal’ in Michael Likosky
(ed.), Transnational Legal Processes (Butterworths: London, 2002) 172. He quotes
the Chief Justice of India who, speaking weeks after the gas leak, said: ‘These
cases must be pursued in the US. It is the only hope these unfortunate people
have.’
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before granting the stay, the court must be convinced that a realistic-
ally adequate alternative forum is available.141
ii. The Factors Taken into Account
It has also been argued that the results of forum non conveniens
applications are unpredictable, with up to 25 different factors being
considered and weighed up, for example in the US. Decisions are
difficult to reconcile.142 Many have pointed out that some of the fac-
tors on which the court relied in Piper, particularly the public factors
associated with witnesses and evidence, reflect a different era, and
that with advances in technology and evidence law now, these factors
should (at the very least) not play the important role they once did.143
The High Court acknowledged the force of this argument in Agar v
Hyde:
Contemporary developments in communications and transport make
the degree of inconvenience and annoyance to which a foreign defend-
ant would be put, if brought into the courts of this jurisdiction, of a
qualitatively different order to that which existed in 1885.144
Similarly, public interest factors such as court congestion which the
court noted in Gulf Oil should not be taken into account. If the court is
to conduct a comparative evaluation of fora which I favour, it would
be difficult for it to assess the ‘relative’ congestion of the two courts
chosen. Given great variation in the choice of law rules applied by
different countries of the world, the forum used to resolve the dispute
141 Finity Jernigan, ‘Forum Non Conveniens: Whose Convenience and Justice?’
(2008) 86 Texas Law Review 1079 at 1080. In making this point, Jernigan cites the
case of Abdullahi v Pfizer Inc, above n. 108, where the case involved a meningitis,
measles and cholera epidemic in Nigeria where Pfizer was testing drugs on
Nigerian residents. Nigerian plaintiffs sued Pfizer in New York but Pfizer
successfully had the action stayed on forum non conveniens grounds. It was
argued in this case that the Nigerian court system was not sufficiently
independent and corruption-free to hear the matter. Jernigan reports that this
assertion was backed by a US State Department report containing findings that
Nigeria was not an adequate alternative forum. The Nigerian courts had
disclaimed an interest in hearing the case, but the stay was nevertheless granted.
142 David Robertson, ‘The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: An Object
Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion’ (1994) 29 Texas International Law Journal 353
at 359; Hans Baade, ‘Foreign Oil Disaster Litigation Prospects in the United States
and the Mid-Atlantic Settlement Formula’ (1989) 7 Journal of Energy and Natural
Resources Law 125 at 140.
143 See for example Davies, above n. 85; Jacqueline Duval-Major, ‘One Way Ticket
Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International
Plaintiff’ (1992) 77 Cornell Law Review 650; Emily Derr, ‘Striking a Better Public–
Private Balance in Forum Non Conveniens’ (2008) 93 Cornell Law Review 820 at
828; see also Calavo Growers of California v Belgium 632 F. 2d 963 at 969 (2nd Cir,
1980) (Newman J), and Fitzgerald v Texaco Inc 521 F. 2d 448 at 456 (Oakes J,
dissenting). For example, Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
the court to consider a range of materials in establishing the content of foreign
law: see further Judge Milton Pollack, ‘Proof of Foreign Law’ (1978) 26 American
Journal of Comparative Law 470; Judge Roger Miner, ‘The Reception of Foreign
Law in the US Federal Courts’ (1995) 43 American Journal of Comparative Law
581.
144 Agar, above n. 10 at 571.
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can make a great difference to the result achieved, particularly in
those jurisdictions which place greater emphasis on the lex fori as the
substantive law, interpret ‘procedure’ broadly, apply a wide view of
‘public policy’ as an exception to the proper law etc. The rights and
responsibilities of the parties should not vary according to a single
judge’s assessment of whether the local courts are ‘too’ congested or
not.
Lord Goff stated in Spiliada that in the application of the ‘more
appropriate forum’ test, the fact that the plaintiff would not obtain
‘justice’ in the foreign jurisdiction was relevant. The High Court in
Voth disagreed with this approach, concluding that there were power-
ful policy considerations why Australian courts should not pass judg-
ment on the ability of another country to accord justice to the
plaintiff.145 Lord Diplock made a similar comment, in the context of a
different country’s procedural laws, referring to the
[i]nvidious task of making a comparison of the relative efficiency of the
civil law and common law procedures for the determination of disputed
facts. In my opinion, it would have been wholly wrong for an English
court, with quite inadequate experience of how it works in practice in a
particular country, to condemn as inferior to that of our own country
a system of procedure for the trial of issues of fact that has long been
adopted by a large number of both developed and developing countries
in the modern world.146
In this respect, I would agree with the High Court’s comments. This
has been a live debate in private international law, underlying much of
the jurisprudence on the substance/procedure distinction, the choice
of law rule in cases of international torts, and questions of public
policy as an exception to the recognition of foreign law. Jurists have
referred to the tendency in some cases for courts, particularly British
courts, to believe that their brand of ‘justice’ was superior to that of
others.147 Lord Denning’s famous dicta inviting forum shoppers to
come to England, where their claims would be heard, for the ‘quality
of the goods and the speed of service’148 comes to mind.
Lord Goff’s suggestion of considering whether the plaintiff could
get justice in the foreign jurisdiction begs the question—how is one to
measure what ‘justice’ is? Is the yardstick to be what British law
145 Voth, above n. 48 at 559.
146 Above n. 28 at 67.
147 Lord Reid in The Atlantic Star [1974] AC 436, stating that Lord Denning’s
comments reflect the ‘good old days’ when British inhabitants felt an innate
superiority over those who belonged to other races; Kirby J in Pfeiffer noted that
the previous ‘dominant position of Britain in the world also led to the temptation,
not always resisted, to consider that British laws were superior to those of other
lands’ (above n. 128 at 547); see also Lord Wilberforce in Chaplin v Boys [1971] AC
356 at 392; Tolofson v Jensen [1994] 3 SCR 1022; and in the context of the
substance/procedure distinction, Dixon CJ in Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR
261 at 267 and Deane J in Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41 at 125.
148 [1973] QB 364 at 381.
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would require? Is it a different standard? Of course, there is no com-
monly acceptable version of ‘justice’; it is in the eye of the beholder.
The risk with such a factor is that it could mask the forum court’s
preference for its own law to be applied in order to achieve ‘justice’,
though it is conceded that its ability to enforce forum bias has been
greatly constrained since the Spiliada decision by changes in choice of
law rules and a redrawing of the substance/procedure divide. As Jus-
tice Cardozo famously stated, ‘we are not so provincial as to say that
every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it other-
wise at home’.149
So, while the author essentially favours the multi-factor approach
adopted in the UK and the US,150 it is submitted that the list of relevant
factors should not include an assessment of the relative merits of the
likely outcome in another jurisdiction (provided the reality on the facts
is that there is access to an independent and impartial tribunal). The
ease of access to evidence/witnesses should not be given the sig-
nificance it formerly had as a factor, due to technological advances.
Nor should process issues such as docket congestion be relevant to
such cases.
VIII. The Link Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
i. Acknowledgement of the Link
It is contended that the link between jurisdiction and choice of law
issues needs to be more fully acknowledged. There has been some
acknowledgement of this in the decisions, with the High Court con-
ceding in its recent forum non conveniens jurisprudence that in the
application of the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test, the question of
the relevant law to be applied was an important, albeit not conclusive,
factor.151 The British decision in Spiliada, which has been applied ever
since in that country and in other countries, included the question of
the governing law as a relevant question in assessing forum non con-
veniens applications, as does the American Piper Aircraft decision,
and the High Court admitted in Voth that the application of the
Australian test would include the Spiliada factors.
Some academics have also argued for a recognition of the relation-
ship between the two doctrines. In writing of the Oceanic case,
149 Loucks v Standard Oil Co of New York 120 NE 198 at 201 (1918).
150 Again, acknowledging that while the approach in these two jurisdictions is in
some respects similar, in other respects there are substantial differences.
151 Justice Brennan also thought that the choice of law question was highly relevant
to the forum non conveniens question: Shaffer v Heitner 433 US 186 at 225 (1978).
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Adrian Briggs also links the two,152 and suggests elsewhere that we
should not consider separately questions of jurisdiction and choice of
law.153 Mortensen, in a critique of the High Court’s adoption of the
renvoi doctrine, concludes on the choice of law issue that:
The key point is that, if the foreign court’s decision deserves deference
to the point that other local policies must comprehensively give way to
it, then it is better that the claim be heard in the foreign court itself.154
While there has been limited acceptance of the link in the US, some
lament the current weakness of the link,155 identification of the proper
law being just one factor in the American courts’ typical156 approach
to questions of forum non conveniens. The comments of Spencer here
are prescient:
For a state to be able to dictate, through its laws, the substantive out-
come of a suit suggests that the state has an interest in the matter
sufficient to permit its laws to govern rather than those of another state.
On what basis then can a jurisdictional doctrine dictate that this same
state is not empowered to adjudicate the very dispute to which its law
applies?157
Some advocate that a stronger link be drawn, in effect arguing that
forum non conveniens decisions are/should be seen as choice of law
decisions in disguise.158 Others argue, alternatively, that choice of
152 ‘All in all the case reveals a noticeable level of preference for adjudication in, and
according to, the domestic law of an Australian court’: Adrian Briggs, ‘Forum
Non Conveniens in Australia’ (1989) 105 Law Quarterly Review 200.
153 Adrian Briggs, ‘In Praise and Defence of Renvoi’ (1998) 47 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 877 at 878: ‘even today we still look at choice of law
and on jurisdiction as if each was self-contained and neither was coloured by the
other’, ‘choice of law [is] a stepping stone to determining jurisdiction, not the
other way around’ (ibid. at 883).
154 Mortensen, above n. 117 at 25.
155 ‘The affinity between personal jurisdiction analysis and choice of law analysis—
which gives great consideration to a state’s interest in having its laws applied to a
dispute—is one that the Supreme Court unfortunately has never endorsed’: A.
Benjamin Spencer, ‘Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis’ (2006) 73
University of Chicago Law Review 617 at 658; Russell Weintraub lamented that
‘some of the most unfortunate statements in the jurisdictional decisions of the
Supreme Court are those denying a relationship between jurisdiction and choice
of law’: ‘Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts:
Time for Change’ (1984) 63 Oregon Law Review 485 at 525; Jernigan, above n. 141
at 1098.
156 Given that there is no one accepted forum non conveniens approach in the United
States; while most states adopt an approach mapped out by the Supreme Court in
Piper and other cases, it is not universal.
157 Spencer, above n. 155 at 659.
158 Stein, above n. 137 at 822; Paul Speck, ‘Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of
Law in Admiralty: Time for an Overhaul’ (1987) 18 Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce 185 at 207.
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law should be seen as an indicator of the appropriateness of a particu-
lar jurisdiction.159
ii. Interest Analysis is Relevant to Choice of Law; It is Also
Relevant in Assessing Forum Non Conveniens Applications
One of the fundamental developments in American conflicts jurispru-
dence in recent times has been the acceptance of interest analysis.160
In simple terms, the idea is that in judging which law should apply to a
particular situation, the interest that a particular jurisdiction might
have in the application of its law to the situation is relevant, and where
more than one jurisdiction is interested, the strength of the interest,
perhaps determined by ‘connecting factors’, is measured and deter-
mines the law chosen. In this analysis, the strength of the interest can
be measured by the use of a range of connecting factors, familiar to
anyone with a passing interest in torts conflicts jurisprudence, for
example, in both the US161 and the UK.162 In other words, the existence
of such connecting factors is not important merely as a box-ticking
exercise, but as a manifestation of the interests that are relevant to the
question of the proper law to be applied.163 This connections ap-
proach is also evident in the rules applicable to choice of law in
contract,164 and in respect of trusts.165
159 Briggs, above n. 153 at 883. Briggs also finds that rules of jurisdiction should not
be considered separately from rules on choice of law.
160 Brainerd Currie, ‘Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the
Conflict of Laws’ (1957) 10 Stanford Law Review 205; Selected Essays in the
Conflict of Laws (1963); Harold Korn, ‘The Choice of Law Revolution: A Critique’
(1983) 83 Columbia Law Review 772; Russell Weintraub, ‘An Approach to Choice
of Law That Focuses on Consequences’ (1993) 56 Alberta Law Review 701.
161 For example, Babcock v Jackson (1963) 191 NE 2d 279; Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws (1971) s. 145 to which a majority of states adhere.
162 The United Kingdom approach, exemplified in the Private International Law
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK), is known as a proper law approach but
considers a range of factors similar to those enumerated in the American
Restatement, albeit as perhaps leading to an exception to the general rule that the
lex loci delicti should apply in torts cases, rather than the American position
where there is no starting presumption. The new Council Regulation 864/2007
also provides for this kind of flexibility, with the prima facie rule being that the
law of the place of the wrong applies, subject to a consideration of connecting
factors: Rome Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations
(Rome II).
163 Spencer, above n. 155 at 645. Spencer laments that ‘the affinity between
jurisdiction analysis and choice of law analysis—which gives greater
consideration to a state’s interest in having its laws applied to a dispute—is one
that the Supreme Court has unfortunately never endorsed’ (ibid. at 658); Harry
Litman, ‘Considerations of Choice of Law in the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens’ (1986) 74 California Law Review 565; Luther McDougall III, ‘Judicial
Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis’ (1982) 35 Vanderbilt Law
Review 1; Spencer Waller, ‘A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure’ (1993) 26
Cornell International Law Journal 101.
164 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980)
(Rome I).
165 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition
(1984).
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While interest analysis has not been accepted per se in relation to
jurisdiction questions, as it has in relation to choice of law questions,
others have noted that the issues are (or should be recognized as)
clearly related.166 There are some examples of its use in relation to
jurisdiction (including questions of assertion of jurisdiction as well as
decline of jurisdiction otherwise available). These include:
(a) McGee v International Life Insurance Co,167 where the Supreme
Court relied on California’s ‘manifest interest in providing ef-
fective means of redress for its residents when their insurers
refuse to pay claims’ in deciding a forum non conveniens
application;
(b) World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson,168 where the court
mentioned the interest of the interstate judicial system in ob-
taining efficient resolution of controversies, and the interest of
several states in furthering their substantial social policies;
(c) In Holmes v Syntex Laboratories, Inc,169 the California Supreme
Court noted the state’s regulatory interest ‘in regulating the
foreign marketing of defective products developed here’ to as-
sert jurisdiction;
(d) In Mullane the court referred to ‘the interest of each state in
providing means to close trusts that exist by grace of its laws
. . . is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish . . . the
right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants’;170
(e) In Calder v Jones, the court found that a California court had
jurisdiction to hear, and should hear, a defamation action
brought by a California resident because the effects of the acts
would be felt in the state;171
(f) In Keeton v Hustler Magazine Inc, the court considered whether
New Hampshire had a ‘legitimate interest in holding the re-
spondent answerable on a claim related to their activities’;172
(g) In Laker Airways Ltd v Pan American World Airways,173 a case
concerning a British company’s allegations that American de-
fendants had violated American antitrust laws, the court re-
jected a forum non conveniens application by the defendants on
the basis that the enforcement of the American antitrust law
was one ‘in which this nation has the highest interest’;
166 Spencer, above n. 155 at 635; Lonny Hoffmann and Keith Rowley, ‘Forum Non
Conveniens in Federal Statutory Cases’ (2000) 49 Emory Law Journal 1137 at 1142;
Davies, above n. 85 at 377. Stein claims that concepts of ‘convenience’ and
‘reasonableness’ often mask substantive choices about governmental interests and
suggests that this be made explicit: Stein, above n. 137 at 836–40.
167 355 US 220 at 223 (1957).
168 (1980) 444 US 286.
169 156 Cal. App 3d 372 at 391, 202 Cal. Rptr 773 at 788 (1984).
170 339 US 313.
171 465 US 783 (1984).
172 465 US 770 (1984).
173 568 F. Supp 811 (DCC, 1983).
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(h) In Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior Court, the Supreme Court
stated in relation to a question of jurisdiction that relevant inter-
ests to be weighed up included the interests of the forum state,
the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies, the shared interest of states
in furthering fundamental social policies, and the federal gov-
ernment’s foreign relation policies;174
(i) In Lueck v Sundstrand Corp, a case involving New Zealand
plaintiffs suing an Arizona-based defendant in a US court in
relation to an accident that occurred in New Zealand, the court
noted that ‘the citizens of Arizona [had] an interest in the manu-
facturing of defective products by corporations located in their
forum . . . [but] the interest in New Zealand regarding this suit is
extremely high . . . The crash involved a New Zealand airline
carrying New Zealand passengers . . . Because the local interest
in this lawsuit is comparatively low, the citizens of Arizona
should not be forced to bear the burden of this dispute’;175
(j) In Re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litigation,
the court noted that California had an interest in the litigation
because some of the defendants were headquartered there and
some of the facts on which the claim was based occurred
there;176
(k) In Harrison v Wyeth Laboratories, the court found that the Eng-
lish interest in regulating drugs in England and protecting its
citizens from injury outweighed Pennsylvania’s interest in
regulating the conduct of corporations based in that state.177
There is some evidence of this thinking, at least in dicta, in the High
Court of Australia decision in Zhang. The court, in discussing the old
Phillips v Eyre rule, declared that the first limb went to jurisdiction
only:
public policy reservations of their nature (the first limb in Phillips, now
recognised as jurisdictional only) cannot be constrained in closed
categories; rather, the modern tendency is to frame them with closer
attention to the respective governmental interests involved178 . . . to the
extent that the first limb of that rule was intended to operate as a
technique of forum control, we should frankly recognise that the ques-
tion is about public policy . . . It is sufficient to say that, should a
174 480 US 102 (1987).
175 236 F. 3d 1137 at 1140–2 (9th Cir, 2001).
176 United States Court of Appeal (7th Cir, 2007); a recent example is King v Brega
and Others (United States Court of Appeal, 11th Circuit, 2009) where forum non
conveniens applied to a case brought by a large number of European courts
against Cessna, an American company, based on an accident that occurred in
Italy. Among a range of factors considered, the court noted the interest that Italy
had in resolving the case due to the incidence of the relevant events in that
jurisdiction.
177 510 F. Supp 1 (ED Pa, 1980), aff’d 676 F. 2d 685 (3rd Cir, 1982).
178 Zhang, above n. 59 at 512–13.
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question arise as to whether public policy considerations direct that an
action not be maintained in Australia, that question is appropriately
resolved as a preliminary issue on an application for a permanent stay
of proceedings.179
Further, where the courts consider connecting factors in order to
establish jurisdiction or consider whether it should be exercised,
these connecting factors are really a mask for questioning the extent
to which a jurisdiction is ‘interested’ in a particular dispute.
At the risk of generalizing, the trend across many areas of choice of
law has been away from an arguably simplistic focus on the law of the
forum, the law of the place of the wrong, or other choice of law as a
mechanistic application, to a more sophisticated analysis whereby the
strength of connection to a range of jurisdictions is considered, in
recognition of the reality that many of these cases involve links with
more than one jurisdiction, such that a mechanistic approach might
not be sufficient to deal with the myriad of possible situations. That
this has been the case can be shown in the choice of law rules for
torts, for example, where the original approach in the US, focusing on
the law of the place of the wrong, has been replaced by a multi-
factored approach,180 and to some extent in Great Britain, where the
original approach which favoured consideration of the law of the
forum and the law of the place of the wrong was replaced by a multi-
faceted approach with a rule followed by a flexible exception embra-
cing a range of connecting factors.181 McDougall notes the same
thing:
A close examination of the developments in these areas reveals that
jurisdictional doctrines and choice-of-law theories have evolved in a
parallel fashion. Justice Story’s territorial principles, which served as
the foundation for the Pennoyer jurisdictional approach, heavily influ-
enced choice of law thinking for decades . . . At about the same time that
the Supreme Court began talking about minimum contacts rather than
power over persons and property in jurisdictional cases, some state
courts were beginning to consider contacts rather than vested rights in
their resolution of choice of law controversies . . . Commentators soon
noted that contacts are relevant only to the extent that they indicate the
interests and policies at stake in a controversy.182
179 Ibid. at 515.
180 This is evidenced by the shift in the approach of the Restatement (First) Conflict of
Laws (1934) where the law of the place of the wrong was favoured, to the
approach of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws (1971) where a multi-
faceted approach was taken.
181 Consider the development of the law from Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1
through Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356 to the Private International Law
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK) to Council Regulation No. 864/2007
(Rome II on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations).
182 McDougall, above n. 163 at 5.
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Further, we see in the evolution of the American law an initial focus
on territorialism in relation to jurisdiction, giving way to a more com-
plex theory taking into account a range of factors.183
It is submitted then, on the assumption that choice of law and
jurisdiction questions are linked and there should be consistency, that
the approach to forum non conveniens that considers the relative
merits of alternative jurisdictions in terms of the strength of their
connections to the dispute as a proxy for the interests involved is a
better approach than one which considers the appropriateness or
otherwise of the chosen forum.
In the Australian context, it is not considered to be a coincidence
that the High Court of Australia has refused to embrace a connecting
factor approach to choice of law questions in tort, unlike other juris-
dictions, and has refused to embrace the Spiliada connecting factor
approach to forum non conveniens applications. The choice of law
rules of other jurisdictions have taken this development, in recogni-
tion that a mechanistic approach favouring the law of the forum/law
of the place of the wrong, and an approach whereby the plaintiff’s
choice of forum is respected unless it is vexatious or oppressive (with-
out considering the relative merits of alternatives or connecting fac-
tors to alternative jurisdictions) are not sufficiently sophisticated to
deal with the kinds of multi-jurisdictional situations that come before
our courts.
IX. Conclusion
The High Court must abandon the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test
as a basis for declining jurisdiction. Reference to notions of oppres-
sion, vexatiousness or abuse of process likewise are not helpful. The
court’s current jurisprudence in this area is internally contradictory,
becoming more complex through the use of exceptions, and there is
evidence that despite what the High Court has said, in effect, if not in
form, courts have adopted the Spiliada approach. The current ap-
proach does not sufficiently value comity among legal systems, and
can be criticized for its parochial nature. The court should, as has
occurred in the UK and US, adopt a ‘more appropriate forum’ test,
allowing it to conduct a comparative evaluation of the merits of poss-
ible alternative fora. This would virtually equate the common law
approach in this area with the approach favoured in various Acts of
Parliament to questions of stays, a desirable consolidation of legal
principle.
The court should consider in assessing such applications the extent
to which each possible jurisdiction in which the case might be heard
is interested in the dispute. Connecting factors, such as the residence
of the parties, the law to be applied, the extent to which any non-
183 This point is explored by Allan Stein, above n. 137 at 803–4.
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residents conduct business or activity in the jurisdiction, whether
there is in fact (practically) an alternative forum are relevant and
important considerations. Questions concerning the availability of
witnesses and evidence should be of secondary importance given
technological advances and changes in rules of evidence. The chosen
court should not conduct a qualitative evaluation of the result likely to
be achieved in any foreign jurisdiction, provided that jurisdiction has
an accessible legal system that accepts the rule of law and an inde-
pendent judiciary.
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